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**Market and Government Failure in Insuring and Mitigating Natural Catastrophes:
How Long-Term Contracts Can Help**

Howard C. Kunreuther and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

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“Insurance plays a vital role in America’s economy by helping households and businesses manage risks. (...) When insurance prices reflect underlying economic costs they can encourage a more efficient allocation of resources. Efforts to keep premiums for insurance against catastrophe hazards artificially low, whether through regulation or through subsidized government programs, can encourage excessively risky behavior on the part of those who might be affected by future catastrophes.”
Economic Report of the President (2007), pp.122-123¹.

1. INTRODUCTION

Given the hundreds of billions of dollars of economic losses due to catastrophes that occurred in the United States since 2001, it is difficult to realize that when Hurricane Hugo hit the country in 1989, it was the first catastrophe to inflict more than \$1 billion of insured losses. But times have changed because of the increased terrorism threat worldwide including the potential for nuclear attacks. Times have changed because of the possibility of international pandemics, world cyber-failure and the financial crises we are currently experiencing. Times have also changed because of the occurrence of a series of unprecedented large-scale natural disasters that have hit the United States repeatedly in the past few years. In other words, we have entered a new era of catastrophes.

While all the above risks are different in character, they have several important features in common: uncertainty and wide variance in losses from one year to the next. Experts and decision makers face challenges in assessing the risks associated with these extreme events, developing strategies for reducing future losses and facilitating the recovery process following a major catastrophe.

Turning to natural disasters, the world has experienced large-scale losses and fatalities due to the increasing concentration of population and activities in high-risk coastal regions of the country. In southeast Asia, the tsunami in December 2004 killed more than 280,000 people residing in coastal areas. Cyclone Nargis, which made landfall in Myanmar in May 2008, killed an estimated 140,000 people, making it the deadliest natural disaster in the recorded history of the country. The same month, the Great Sichuan Earthquake in China is estimated to have killed nearly 70,000 people, 18,000 are still missing, 374,000 were injured, and almost five million were made homeless. (Munich Re 2008).

But even in a developed country like the United States, which has extensive experience with natural catastrophes and resources to adequately prepare, the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons have demonstrated the lack of adequate loss reduction measures and emergency preparedness capacity to deal with large-scale natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina, which hit Louisiana and Mississippi at the end of August 2005, killed 1,300 people and forced 1.5 million people to evacuate the affected area - a historic record for the country. Economic damages are estimated in the range of US\$150 to US\$200 billion.

¹ It is quite remarkable that 2007 was the first year that the *Economic Report of the President* devoted a chapter to catastrophe risk insurance.

After two relatively quiet hurricane seasons in 2006 and 2007 in the U.S., a series of hurricanes made landfall in 2008, causing billions of dollars in direct economic losses along the Caribbean Basin and in the U.S. Hurricane Ike was the most expensive individual event in 2008 with an estimated privately insured loss of \$16 billion, followed by Hurricane Gustav with insured losses estimated at \$4 billion. Based on these figures Ike ranks as the third most devastating weather-related disaster in U.S. history, after Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Andrew which hit southeast Florida in August 1992. (Swiss Re, 2008).

These recent catastrophes highlight the challenges of mitigating and financing natural disasters, issues that are now high on the business and policy agendas of many countries. The question is not whether other large-scale catastrophes will occur, but when and how frequently they will strike, and the extent of the damage and fatalities they will cause. Now is the time to develop and implement economically sound policies and strategies for managing the risk and consequences of future disasters.

A coherent strategy is necessary to ensure a sustainable recovery from large-scale disasters and the appropriate future development of hazard-prone areas. But these issues are complex. They challenge our capacity as a nation to work together despite different agendas of key stakeholders and legislators regarding the role and responsibilities of the private and public sectors in dealing with catastrophic risks. Absence of leadership in this area will inevitably lead to unnecessary loss of lives and economic destruction in the devastated regions.

This paper complements other analyses in this volume by focusing on the risk of large-scale natural disasters, although we believe the concepts and proposals for managing these risks more effectively have relevance to other types of extreme events such as terrorism and catastrophic accidents.² The paper is organized as follows. **Section 2** discusses the evolution over the past four decades of economic and insured losses due to major catastrophes and the key drivers of this change. **Section 3** proposes four guiding principles for developing sustainable insurance and mitigation programs. **Section 4** focuses on the state of Florida as an example of how these principles have been violated to meet short-term objectives with respect to economic development. **Section 5** focuses on the behavioral biases, notably myopia, that discourages individuals from investing in cost effective protective measures. **Section 6** proposes long-term insurance contracts combined with long-term loans for overcoming these biases. The National Flood Insurance Program, which is due for renewal/changes by Congress in April 2009, is a natural candidate for these contracts as discussed in **Section 7**. The paper concludes with a brief summary and suggestions for future research.

2. A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES.

2.1. Recent Changes in the Impacts of Extreme Events

The economic and insured losses from great natural catastrophes such as hurricanes, earthquakes and floods worldwide have increased significantly in recent years, as shown in Figure 1 (each vertical bar represents the total economic losses, and the darker zone represents the insured

² For a detailed analysis on terrorism insurance by the authors, see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2004), Wharton Risk Center (2005), Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2006) and Michel-Kerjan et al. (2009). For a detailed analysis of the question of natural disaster insurance and mitigation in the U.S., see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009).

portion of it). A comparison of these economic losses over time reveals a huge increase: \$53.6 billion (1950–1959), \$93.3 billion (1960–1969), \$161.7 billion (1970–1979), \$262.9 billion (1980–1989), and \$778.3 billion (1990–1999). Between 2000 and 2008, there were \$620.6 billion in losses, principally a result of the 2004, 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons, which produced historic records.




FIGURE 1. EVOLUTION OF “GREAT NATURAL CATASTROPHES” WORLDWIDE, 1950-2007

Sources: Data from Munich Re, 2008 Geo Risks Research – in U.S. \$ billion indexed to 2007

Catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers since 1990 than in the entire history of insurance. Between 1970 and the mid-1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters (including forest fires) were in the \$3 billion to \$4 billion range. The insured losses from Hurricane Hugo, which made landfall in Charleston, South Carolina in September, 1989, exceeded \$4 billion (1989 prices). There was a radical increase in insured losses in the early 1990s, with Hurricane Andrew in Florida (\$23.7 billion in 2007 dollars) and the Northridge earthquake in California (\$19.6 billion in 2007 dollars). The four hurricanes in Florida in 2004 (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) collectively totaled almost \$33 billion in insured losses. Hurricane Katrina alone cost insurers and reinsurers an estimated \$46 billion, with total losses paid by private insurers resulting from major natural catastrophes in 2005 at \$87 billion.³ Figure 2 depicts the upward trend in worldwide insured losses from catastrophes between 1970 and 2008.⁴

³ This figure excludes payment by the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) for damage due to 2005 flooding (over \$20 billion in claims).

⁴ Munich Re and Swiss Re, the two leading reinsurers in the world, do not use the same definition of catastrophic losses. Natural disasters inflicting insured losses above \$38.7 million or total losses above \$77.5 million are considered a major catastrophes by Swiss Re. Munich Re considers a higher threshold, which explains the difference between Figures 1.1 and 1.2. For example, when Munich Re estimated insured loss from natural disasters at about \$42 billion in 2004, Swiss Re’s estimate was over \$52 billion. As a result, most figures used in the literature regarding the evolution of catastrophe loss actually underestimate the real effect on insurers. We appreciate Swiss Re’s and Munich Re’s willingness to share their 2007 estimates prior to their publication.




FIGURE 2. WORLDWIDE EVOLUTION OF CATASTROPHE INSURED LOSSES, 1970-2008

(9/11: All lines, including property and business interruption (BI);
in U.S. \$ billion indexed to 2007; except for 2008 which is current)

Source: Wharton Risk Center with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute

Table 1 reveals the twenty most costly catastrophes for the insurance sector since 1970 (in 2007 dollars). Of these twenty major events, ten have occurred since 2001, nine of which were in the United States. Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake were the first two disasters that the industry experienced where losses were greater than \$10 billion (designated as *super-cats*) and caused insurers to reflect on whether risks from natural disasters were still insurable. To assist them in making this determination, many firms began using catastrophe models to estimate the likelihood and consequences to their insured portfolios from specific disasters in hazard-prone areas (Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005). With the exception of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, all of the events in the top twenty were natural disasters.⁵ More than 80 percent of these were weather-related events—hurricanes and typhoons, storms, and floods—with nearly three-quarters of the claims in the United States.

Losses resulting from natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2006 were far below the losses in 2004 and 2005. Of the \$48 billion in catastrophe-related economic losses, \$16 billion was covered by insurance (\$11 billion for natural disasters and \$5 billion for man-made). During the past twenty years, only 1988 and 1997, had insured losses lower than those in 2006.⁴ According to Munich Re, there were 950 natural catastrophes in 2007, the most since 1974. They inflicted nearly \$27 billion in insured losses. Swiss Re estimates that insured losses soared to \$50 billion for the industry in 2008 making it one of the three costliest year ever. Natural catastrophes accounted for \$43 billion of these losses with man-made disasters making up the remaining \$7 billion. (Swiss Re, 2008).

⁵ See the chapter by Jaffee and Russell in this volume for a detailed discussion of terrorism insurance markets.

**TABLE 1. THE 20 MOST COSTLY INSURED IN THE WORLD, 1970-2007
(INDEXED TO 2007 PRICES)**

U.S.\$ Billion (indexed to 2007)	Event	Victims (Dead or missing)	Year	Area of Primary Damage
46.3	Hurricane Katrina	1,836	2005	USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al.
35.5	9/11 Attacks	3,025	2001	USA
23.7	Hurricane Andrew	43	1992	USA, Bahamas
19.6	Northridge Earthquake	61	1994	USA
14.1	Hurricane Ivan	124	2004	USA, Caribbean, et al.
13.3	Hurricane Wilma	35	2005	USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al.
10.7	Hurricane Rita	34	2005	USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al.
8.8	Hurricane Charley	24	2004	USA, Caribbean, et al.
8.6	Typhoon Mireille	51	1991	Japan
7.6	Hurricane Hugo	71	1989	Puerto Rico, USA, et al.
7.4	Winterstorm Daria	95	1990	France, UK, et al.
7.2	Winterstorm Lothar	110	1999	France, Switzerland, et al.
6.1	Winterstorm Kyrill	54	2007	Germany, UK, NL, France
5.7	Storms and floods	22	1987	France, UK, et al.
5.6	Hurricane Frances	38	2004	USA, Bahamas
5.0	Winterstorm Vivian	64	1990	Western/Central Europe
5.0	Typhoon Bart	26	1999	Japan
4.5	Hurricane Georges	600	1998	USA, Caribbean
4.2	Tropical Storm Alison	41	2001	USA
4.2	Hurricane Jeanne	3,034	2004	USA, Caribbean, et al.

Sources: Wharton Risk Center with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute

The occurrence of damaging hurricanes is highly variable and uncertain from year to year. However, it is almost certain that in the coming years more hurricanes will strike the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Other parts of the nation will experience severe floods (as occurred in the upper Midwest in 2008) and earthquakes, causing extreme damage to residential and commercial property and infrastructure.

There is a very clear message from these data. Twenty or thirty years ago, large-scale natural disasters were considered to be low-probability/high consequence events. Today, they are not only causing considerably greater economic losses than in the past but also appear to be occurring at an accelerating pace. In this context, it is important to understand more fully the factors influencing these changes so as to design more effective programs for reducing losses from future disasters.

2.2. The Question of Attribution

There are at least two principal socio-economic factors that directly influence the level of economic losses due to catastrophic events: *degree of urbanization* and *value at risk*. In 1950, approximately 30 percent of the world's population lived in cities. In 2000, about 50 percent of the world's population (6 billion) resided in urban areas. Projections by the United Nations show that by 2025, that figure will have increased to 60 percent based on a world population estimate of 8.3 billion people.

In the U.S. in 2003, 53 percent of the nation's population, or 153 million people, lived in the 673 U.S. coastal counties, an increase of 33 million people since 1980, according to the

National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration. And the nation's coastal population is expected to increase by more than 12 million by 2015 (Crossett, et. al., 2004).⁶ Yet coastal counties, excluding Alaska, account for only 17 percent of land area in the United States.

In hazard-prone areas, this urbanization and increase of population also translates into greater concentration of exposure and hence a higher likelihood of catastrophic losses from future disasters. Insurance density is another critical socio-economic factor to consider when evaluating the evolution of insured loss due to weather-related catastrophes. These factors will continue to have a major impact on the level of insured losses from natural catastrophes. Given the growing concentration of exposure on the Gulf Coast, another hurricane like Katrina hitting the Gulf Coast is likely to inflict significant property damage unless strong mitigation measures are put in place.⁷

In order to better understand this new vulnerability, it is possible to calculate the total direct economic cost of the major hurricanes in the U.S. in the past century, adjusted for inflation, population and wealth normalization. More specifically, one can estimate what each of these hurricanes would have cost had they hit today. This exercise has been done in several studies. The most recent one by Pielke et al. (2008) normalizes to the year 2005 mainland U.S. hurricane damage for the period 1900–2005.

Table 2 provides estimates for the top 20 most costly hurricanes assuming they had occurred in 2005 using two approaches for normalizing these losses, each of which gives a cost estimate. The table provides the range of costs between these two estimates, the year when the hurricane originally occurred, the states that were the most seriously affected and the hurricane category on the Saffir-Simpson scale. The data reveal that the hurricane that hit Miami in 1926 would have been almost twice as costly as Hurricane Katrina had it occurred in 2005, and the Galveston hurricane of 1900 would have had total direct economic costs as high as those from Katrina. This means that independently of any possible change in weather patterns we are very likely to see even more devastating disasters in the coming years because of the ongoing growth in values located in risk-prone areas.

There is another element to consider in determining how to adequately manage and finance catastrophe risks; the possible impact of a change in climate on future weather-related catastrophes. Between 1970 and 2004, storms and floods were responsible for over **90 percent** of the total economic costs of extreme weather-related events worldwide. Storms (*hurricanes* in the U.S. region, *typhoons* in Asia and *windstorms* in Europe) contributed to over 75 percent of insured losses. In constant prices (2004), insured losses from weather-related events averaged \$3 billion annually between 1970 and 1990 and then increased significantly to \$16 billion annually between 1990 and 2004 (Association of British Insurers, 2005). In 2005, 99.7 percent of all catastrophic losses worldwide were due to weather-related events (Mills and Lecomte, 2006).

⁶ This proportion varies depending on the definition of “coastal counties” one considers. Taking a more restrictive definition (i.e. any county that has a coastline bordering the open ocean or associated sheltered water bodies or a county that contains V zones (as defined by the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program), one still finds that the proportion of population living in such counties is 30 percent. (Crowell et al., 2007).

⁷ For additional data on the economic impact of future catastrophic hurricanes, see Financial Services Roundtable (2007).

**TABLE 2. TOP 20 HURRICANE SCENARIOS (1900-2005)
RANKED USING 2005 INFLATION, POPULATION, AND WEALTH NORMALIZATION**

Rank	Hurricane	Year	Category	Cost range (\$ billion) in 2005
1	Miami (Southeast FL/MS/AL)	1926	4	140-157
2	Katrina (LA/MS)	2005	3	81
3	North Texas (Galveston)	1900	4	72-78
4	North Texas (Galveston)	1915	4	57-62
5	Andrew (Southeast FL and LA)	1992	5-3	54-60
6	New England (CT/MA/NY/RI)	1938	3	37-39
7	Southwest Florida	1944	3	35-39
8	Lake Okeechobee (Southeast Florida)	1928	4	32-34
9	Donna (FL-NC/NY)	1960	4-3	29-32
10	Camille (MS/Southeast LA/VA)	1969	5	21-24
11	Betsy (Southeast FL and LA)	1965	3	21-23
12	Wilma	2005	3	21
13	Agnes (FL/CT/NY)	1972	1	17-18
14	Diane (NC)	1955	1	17
15	4 (Southeast FL/LA/AL/MS)	1947	4-3	15-17
16	Hazel (SC/NC)	1954	4	16-23
17	Charley (Southwest FL)	2004	4	16
18	Carol (CT/NY/RI)	1954	3	15-16
19	Hugo (SC)	1989	4	15-16
20	Ivan (Northwest FL/AL)	2004	3	15

Sources: Data from Pielke et al. (2008)

There have been numerous discussions and scientific debates as to whether the series of major hurricanes that occurred in 2004 and 2005 might be partially attributable to the impact of a change in climate.⁸ One of the expected effects of global warming will be an increase in hurricane intensity. This has been predicted by theory and modeling, and substantiated by empirical data on climate change. Higher ocean temperatures lead to an exponentially higher evaporation rate in the atmosphere which increases the intensity of cyclones and precipitation. The results to date raise issues with respect to the insurability of weather-related catastrophes given that an increase in the number of major hurricanes over a shorter period of time is likely to translate into a greater number hitting the coasts, with a greater likelihood of damage to a much larger number of residences and commercial buildings today than in the 1940s.

The combination of increasing urbanization, concentration of value in high-risk areas, and the potential impact of a change in weather-patterns raises questions for the insurance industry as to how they will provide protection against catastrophic risks in the future. Traditional insurance relies on geographical *and* time diversification, both of which are somewhat compromised by these recent trends. The appropriate the roles and responsibilities of the private and public sectors (as a source of financial support or as market regulator) is critical in this regard.

⁸ For more details on the scientific evidence regarding climate change and its impact see Stern Review (2006).

3. Guiding Principles for Mitigating and Insuring against Catastrophes

To address the question as to what roles the private and public sectors can play in addressing these issues, we propose the following guiding principles for using the insurance infrastructure to deal more effectively with natural disasters:

Principle 1: Premiums reflecting risk: Insurance premiums should be based on risk in order to provide signals to individuals as to the hazards they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes. Risk-based premiums should also reflect the cost of capital insurers need to integrate into their pricing to assure adequate return to their investors.

The application of Principle 1 provides a clear signal of likely damage to those currently residing in areas subject to natural disasters and those who are considering moving into these regions. Risk-based premiums would also enable insurers to provide discounts to homeowners and businesses that invest in cost-effective loss-reduction mitigation measures. If insurance premiums are not risk based, insurers have no economic incentive to offer these discounts. In fact, they prefer not to offer coverage to these property owners because it is a losing proposition in the long run.

Principle 2: Dealing with equity and affordability issues. Any special treatment given to homeowners currently residing in hazard-prone areas (e.g., low-income uninsured or inadequately insured homeowners) should come from general public funding and not through insurance premium subsidies.

Principle 2 reflects a concern for some residents in high-hazard areas who will be faced with large premium increases if insurers are permitted to adhere to Principle 1. As discussed in the next section, regulations imposed by state insurance commissioners keep premiums in many regions subject to hurricane damage artificially lower than the risk-based level.

Note that Principle 2 applies only to individuals who ***currently reside*** in a hazard-prone area. Those who decide to move to the area in the future should be charged premiums that reflect the risk. If they were provided with financial assistance from public sources to purchase insurance, the resulting public policy would directly encourage development in hazard-prone areas and exacerbate the potential for catastrophic losses from future disasters.

Principle 3: Sufficient Demand for Coverage: The demand by individuals and firms for insurance coverage with risk-based premiums should be sufficiently high so that insurers can cover the fixed costs of introducing a program for providing coverage and spreading the risk broadly through their portfolios. High demand for insurance would also reduce the level of state and federal relief to uninsured or underinsured in the aftermath of the next disaster.

Principle 4: Minimize Likelihood of Insolvency: Insurers and reinsurers should determine how much coverage to offer, and what premium to charge against the risk, so that the chances of insolvency are below some predefined acceptable threshold level.

Insurance regulators should play an important role here in assuring that insurers providing coverage in high-risk areas have a solid financial basis for doing so.

4. When These Principles Have Been Violated: The Case of Florida

Florida is a classic example of how each of these principles have been violated to encourage rapid economic development in coastal areas subject to hurricanes, primarily through the construction of residential home and homes for retirees moving to the state. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the population of Florida has increased significantly over the past fifty years: 2.8 million inhabitants in 1950, 6.8 million in 1970, 13.0 million in 1990, and a projected 19.3 million population in 2010 (almost a 700 percent increase since 1950). These developments increase the likelihood of severe economic losses, unless cost-effective mitigation measures are implemented.

According to a study undertaken by Munich Re (2000), Florida also has a high density of insurance coverage, with most houses covered against windstorm losses and about one-third insured against floods under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).⁹ In 2008, the modeling firm AIR Worldwide estimated that nearly 80 percent of insured property assets in Florida are located near the coasts, the high-risk area of the state. In dollar value, it was estimated that as of December 2007, no less than \$2.4 trillion of insured exposure were located in coastal areas (commercial and residential exposure). It does not take rocket science to understand that this is a ticking time bomb ready to explode when the next major hurricane hit this region again.

A principal reason why Florida has become of great concern with respect to the financial management of natural disasters is that the above principles for managing risk equitably and efficiently have been violated by recent legislative changes in the state. Let us look at each one of them in turn:

Principle 1: Premiums reflecting risk

After Hurricane Andrew, Florida regulators resisted large rate increases proposed by insurers and allowed them to raise premiums only gradually over the decade. Initially this policy exacerbated supply availability problems because insurers were concerned about significant rate inadequacy. (Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer 2004). Over time, as insurers were allowed to increase rates further, these concerns eased, although insurers believed that there was still some compression of rates in the highest-risk areas. After the four hurricanes which hit Florida in 2004, the State Insurance Commissioner resisted rate increases proposed again by insurers.

Florida's property insurance residual market mechanism, the Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens") has experienced significant expansion in recent years with legislative changes in 2007 accelerating that growth. Conceptually a residual mechanism should be an insurance source of last resort for property owners who cannot obtain insurance in the voluntary market. Florida legislation passed in 2007 substantially departs from this concept by allowing Citizens to compete with the voluntary market at rates considerably below risk in hurricane-prone areas of the states. More specifically, consumers were allowed to purchase a policy from Citizens if a comparable policy would cost 25 percent more in the voluntary market.¹⁰ The legislation allowed Citizens to decrease rates in 2007 and precludes it from raising rates until

⁹ The NFIP is a federal insurance program created in 1968. Insurers play the role of intermediaries between the policyholders and the federal government. Following Hurricane Katrina, the program had to borrow \$20 billion from the federal government in 2006 to meet its claims. Congress is considering modifying the program substantially. For a more detailed discussion of recent operation of the NFIP, see Michel-Kerjan, E. and C. Kousky (2008).

¹⁰ This difference was reduced to 15 percent in 2008 legislation.

2009. As a result of these legislative changes, Citizens had sold 1.2 million policies as of June 2008 mostly to residents in high-hazard areas at rates considerably below what would be offered by private insurers.¹¹ Today Citizens is the largest insurance provider in the State of Florida. The violation of Principle 1 is even more pronounced because if Citizens runs a deficit, the company can legally recoup it against other insurers in the state (who will then levy the recoupment charge against their policyholders). To us and many others, Florida has become an aberration where a state-run company offers insurance rates at artificially low prices for political reasons, thus providing Floridians with a false sense of security and then has recourse to recoup any deficits experience from claims following a severe hurricane. It should come as no surprise that large insurers, such as Allstate, decided not to renew any of their policies in Florida preferring to allocate their capital to other markets.

If insurers were permitted to charge premiums reflecting risk, homeowners mitigated their property to reduce future damage and private reinsurance was in place, we have shown that private insurers would be able to allocate enough capital to this state to cover losses from a hurricane hitting the coast of Florida with a return period of 100 years. More specifically if insurers were to devote 10 percent of their surplus to providing coverage against a 100-year hurricane in Florida, they would be able to cover 100 percent of the market for homeowners coverage. (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009).

Principle 2: Dealing with equity and affordability issues.

Although rates are highly subsidized in the coastal areas of Florida, those deserving special treatment due to affordability concerns are not singled out. In fact, a high income person with a second home along the coast currently receives the same percentage subsidy as do low income homeowners with a single family dwelling residing in the same area. We have shown that this affordability issue can be quite significant. Using data from the American Housing Survey on several cities in Florida and looking at several different definitions of the affordability threshold, it appears that a significant number of owner-occupied homes are owned by households with incomes below these prescribed levels. For example, if the affordability threshold is set at 200 percent of the federal poverty line, we found that 27 percent and 31 percent of owner-occupied homes in Miami and Tampa, respectively, are owned by households that cannot afford insurance. (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). To our knowledge, no consideration has been given to offering grants in the form of insurance stamps to aid those homeowners in financial need.

Principle 3: Sufficient Demand for Coverage

Most homeowners are required to purchase homeowners insurance as a condition for a mortgage. Given that premiums in high hazard areas are highly subsidized, the demand for coverage from these individuals as well as those homeowners without a mortgage has been much greater than the supply offered by the private sector. As discussed, this accounts for the extensive growth of Citizens, during the past several years.

¹¹ For more details on Florida's regulatory system see Chap. 2 in Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009).

Principle 4: Minimize Likelihood of Insolvency:

Following Hurricane Andrew, eleven insurers became insolvent. After the four hurricanes which hit Florida in 2004, only one the Poe insurance group became insolvent, thus suggesting that insurers had learned their lesson from Andrew and instituted a more diversified portfolio of risks in the state. As a result of the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes in the U.S., many private insurers decided to limit their coverage in Florida. They know they cannot charge premiums reflecting risk and are concerned that they will suffer severe losses from future hurricanes that would significantly reduce their surplus and could result in insolvency. Some insurers like State Farm and Allstate have established state companies so that the parent company is not subjected to the chance of insolvency.

We have shown that if there were a major hurricane tomorrow with a return period of 100 years, Citizens would not have enough reserves on hand to pay the claims and would thus have to assess all private insurers for its deficit. These insurers would then likely assess these charges to their policyholders. In other words, all those who purchased property insurance in the state would help bail out Citizens. An open question is whether these policyholders realize the extent of this post-disaster payment. If they do, this might create a disincentive for them to purchase insurance voluntarily. In 2007 and 2008, Citizens developed a management plan for the issuance of bonds that would help cover part of its deficit. Given the current financial crisis, there is some doubt as to the viability and cost of this protection.

Summary

It should be clear that Florida's failure to meet the above principles encourages development in hazard-prone areas, and opens up the possibility of insolvency of the State insurer, Citizens, and cross-subsidization by all policyholders. One can also speculate as to whether a series of truly catastrophe hurricanes and associated flood surges would lead the federal government to help bail out the state of Florida so all U.S. taxpayers would be responsible for covering a portion of these losses. Furthermore the current system in Florida discourages individuals from investing in cost-effective mitigation measures, a topic to which we now turn.

5. The Behavioral Challenges: The Demand for Insurance and Mitigation

How effective can mitigation be in reducing exposure to future disaster? In order to shed some light on this question, we undertook an analysis of the impact that mitigation would have on reducing losses from hurricanes that would occur in four states: Florida, New York, South Carolina and Texas. (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). In our analysis of the impact of mitigation, we consider two extreme cases: one in which no one has invested in mitigation, the other in which everyone has invested in predefined mitigation measures. From the U.S. Hurricane Model developed by the catastrophe modeling firm Risk Management Solutions (RMS), losses were calculated on a ground up and gross basis, assuming an appropriate mitigation measure across the insured portfolio. The mitigation measures were based on various assumptions for the different regions. For example, in Florida, the requirements as defined by the Institute for Business and Home Safety's (IBHS) *The Fortified ... for Safer Living* program was used to incorporate mitigation. Of course, this program is only for new construction. So, when

we describe an analysis using these recommendations, it is the retrofit techniques that are aligned with the features of the Fortified program. In New York, South Carolina and Texas mitigation means the application of the latest building codes to the residential structures.¹²

Table 3 indicates the differences in losses and savings from adoption mitigation measures for hurricanes with return periods of 100, 250, and 500 years for each of the four states we are studying when these loss-reduction measures are in place.

TABLE 3. MONEY SAVED IN REDUCED LOSSES FROM FULL MITIGATION FOR DIFFERENT RETURN PERIODS

State	100-Year Event			250-Year Event			500-Year Event		
	Unmitigated Losses	Savings in Reduced Losses from Mitigation (\$)	Savings in Reduced Losses from Mitigation (%)	Unmitigated Losses	Savings in Reduced Losses from Mitigation (\$)	Savings in Reduced Losses from Mitigation (%)	Unmitigated Losses	Savings in Reduced Losses from Mitigation (\$)	Savings in Reduced Losses from Mitigation (%)
FL	\$84 billion	\$51 billion	61%	\$126 billion	\$69 billion	55%	\$160 billion	\$83 billion	52%
NY	\$6 billion	\$2 billion	39%	\$13 billion	\$5 billion	37%	\$19 billion	\$7 billion	35%
SC	\$4 Billion	\$2 billion	44%	\$7 billion	\$3 billion	41%	\$9 billion	\$4 billion	39%
TX	\$17 billion	\$6 billion	34%	\$27 billion	\$9 billion	32%	\$37 billion	\$12 billion	31%

The analyses reveal that mitigation has the potential to significantly reduce losses from future hurricanes ranging from 61 percent in Florida for a 100-year return period loss to 31 percent in the state of New York for a 500-year return period loss. In Florida alone, the use of mitigation leads to a \$51 billion reduction in losses for a 100-year event and \$83 billion for a 500-year event. These findings are important given the costly capital needed to cover the tail of the distribution of extreme events. Adoption of mitigation measures on residential structures significantly reduces, if not eliminates, this tail in each of these four states.

The challenge, however, lies in making sure residents in hazard-prone areas invest in these mitigation measures. Indeed, recent extreme events have highlighted the challenges associated with reducing losses from hurricanes and other natural hazards due to what one of us has termed the *natural disaster syndrome* (Kunreuther, 1996). Many homeowners, private businesses and public sector organizations do not voluntarily adopt cost-effective loss-reduction measures. Hence, these areas are highly vulnerable and unprepared should a severe hurricane or other natural disaster occur. The magnitude of the destruction following a catastrophe often leads governmental agencies to provide disaster relief to victims even if prior to the event the government claimed that it had no intention of doing so. This combination of underinvestment in

¹² We are assuming that because these measures are incorporated in building codes they are cost-effective. In other words, the discounted long-term expected benefits from the mitigation measure over the projected life of the house is greater than its upfront costs. By obtaining detailed cost estimates for specific mitigation measures incorporated in building codes or Florida's *Fortified ... for Safer Living* program one could rank their relative cost-effectiveness..

protection prior to the catastrophic event, together with the general taxpayer financing some of the recovery can be critiqued on both efficiency and equity grounds.

There are a range of informal mechanisms that explain this natural hazard syndrome. One relates to framing the problem imperfectly: experts focus on the likelihood and consequences as two key elements of the risk. Several studies show, however, that individuals rarely seek out probability estimates in making their decisions. When these data are given to them, decision makers often do not use the information. In one study, researchers found that only 22 percent of subjects sought out probability information when evaluating several risky managerial decisions. People have particular difficulty dealing with probabilistic information for small likelihood events. They need a context in which to evaluate the likelihood of an event occurring. They have a hard time gauging how concerned to feel about a 1 in 100,000 probability of death without some comparison points. Most people just do not know whether 1 in 100,000 is a large risk or a small risk. In one study individuals could not distinguish the relative safety of a chemical plant that had an annual chance of experiencing a catastrophic accident that varied from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million (Kunreuther, Novemsky and Kahneman, 2001).

There is also evidence that firms and residents tend to ignore risks whose subjective odds are seen as falling below some threshold. Prior to a disaster, many individuals perceive its likelihood as sufficiently low that they contend *it will not happen to me*. As a result, they do not feel the need to invest voluntarily in protective measures, such as strengthening their house or buying insurance. It is only after the disaster occurs that these same individuals express remorse that they didn't undertake protective measures.

Another reason that individuals do not invest in protective measures is that they are highly myopic and tend to focus on the returns only over the next couple of years. In addition, there is extensive experimental evidence showing that human temporal discounting tends to be hyperbolic so that events in the distant future are disproportionately discounted relative to immediate ones. As an example, people are willing to pay more to have the timing of the receipt of a cash prize accelerated from tomorrow to today, than from two days from now to tomorrow (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991). The implication of hyperbolic discounting for mitigation decisions is that we are asking residents to invest a tangible fixed sum now to achieve a future benefit that we instinctively undervalue—and one that we, paradoxically, hope never to see at all. The effect of placing too much weight on immediate considerations is that the upfront costs of mitigation will loom disproportionately large relative to the delayed expected benefits in losses over time.

There is extensive evidence that residents in hazard-prone areas do not undertake loss-prevention measures voluntarily. A 1974 survey of more than 1,000 California homeowners in earthquake-prone areas revealed that only 12 percent of the respondents had adopted any protective measure (Kunreuther et al., 1978). Fifteen years later, there was little change despite the increased public awareness of the earthquake hazard. In a 1989 survey of 3,500 homeowners in four California counties at risk from earthquakes, only 5 to 9 percent of the respondents in these areas reported adopting any loss reduction measures. Palm et al. (1990), Burby et al. (1988) and Laska (1991) have found a similar reluctance by residents in flood-prone areas to invest in mitigation measures.

In the case of flood damage, Burby (2006) provides compelling evidence that actions taken by the federal government, such as constructing levees, make residents feel safe, when in

fact they are still targets for catastrophes should the levee be breached or overtopped. This problem is reinforced by local public officials who do not enforce building codes and/or impose land-use regulations to restrict development in high hazard areas. If developers do not design homes to be resistant to disasters and individuals do not voluntarily adopt mitigation measures, one can expect large scale losses following a catastrophic event, as evidenced by the property damage to New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina.

Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a large number of residents had still not invested in relatively inexpensive loss-reduction measures with respect to their property, nor had they undertaken emergency preparedness measures. A survey of 1,100 adults living along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts undertaken in May 2006 revealed that 83 percent of the responders had taken no steps to fortify their home, 68 percent had no hurricane survival kit and 60 percent had no family disaster plan. (Goodnough, 2006). The fact that homeowners do not necessarily invest in cost-effective mitigation measures nor purchase adequate insurance coverage on their own if not required to do so, should not simply be considered irrational. As we just discussed, people might have their own reasons for not taking these actions until after the next disaster occurs. We thus turn to the need for long-term contracts to address these issues.

6. A New Concept: The Development of Long-Term Contracts¹³

We propose moving from the standard one-year insurance contracts for homeowners' and flood insurance for residential properties to long-term insurance ("LTI" hereafter) so as to encourage property owners to invest in cost-effective mitigation measures. In the case of homeowners coverage (which includes protection against the effects of wind damage, but not flood losses), some insurers have recently restricted the sale of new homeowners' policies in hurricane prone areas. Policyholders cannot help but worry that their existing coverage might be subject to unexpected cancellation or very significant premium increases, particularly if there is severe hurricane damage in the near future.

Need for Long-Term Insurance

Short-term insurance policies foster significant social costs. Evidence from recent disasters reveals that consumers who fail to adequately protect their home or even insure at all, create a welfare cost to themselves and a possible cost to all taxpayers in the form of government disaster assistance. Under the current U.S. system, the Governor of the state(s) can request that the President declare a "major disaster" and offer special assistance if the damage is severe enough. The number of Presidential disaster declarations has dramatically increased over the past 50 years: there had been 162 over the period 1955-1965, 282 over 1966-1975, 319 over the period 1986-1995 and 545 during 1996-2005 (Michel-Kerjan, 2008).

The development of LTI should also encourage individuals to invest in cost-effective mitigation measures. As pointed out above many homeowners do not invest in such measures due to myopia and budget constraints. They are unwilling to incur the high upfront cost associated with these investments relative to the small premium discount they would receive the

¹³ This section draws heavily on Jaffee, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2008).

following year which reflects the expected reduction in annual insured losses (Kunreuther, Meyer and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). If an LTI policy were coupled with a long-term home improvement loan tied to the mortgage, the reduction in insurance premiums would exceed the annual loan payment. The social welfare benefits of LTI coupled with long-term mitigation loans over N years could be significant: there will be less damage to property, reduction in costs of protection against catastrophic losses by insurers, more secure mortgages and lower costs to the government for disaster assistance.

Why Does a Market for Long-Term Insurance Not Exist Today?

In his seminal work on uncertainty and welfare economics, Kenneth Arrow defined “the absence of marketability for an action which is identifiable, technologically possible and capable of influencing some individuals’ welfare (...) as a failure of the existing market to provide a means whereby the services can be both offered and demanded upon the payment of a price.” (Arrow,1963). Here we shall discuss several factors which have contributed to the non-marketability of LTI for protecting homeowners’ property against losses from fire, theft and large-scale natural disasters. We discuss elements which affect both the supply and demand sides.

Supply Side Today, due to political pressure, insurance rates are frequently restricted to be artificially low in hazard-prone areas, as illustrated by Florida’s actions in recent years. The result is that the risks most subject to catastrophic losses also become the most unattractive for insurers to market. A second stumbling block, derived from premium regulation, is that insurers are unclear as to how much they will be allowed to charge in the future. Uncertainty regarding costs of capital and changes in risk over time may also deter insurers from providing long-term insurance. In principle, of course, insurers could add a component in their premiums to account for the costs created by these factors. The problem is that the insurance regulator presumed to be representing consumers interests, may not allow these costs to be embedded in the approved premiums. Furthermore, it is unclear what the voluntary demand for coverage will be, given the resulting premiums. In a real sense, a new and less intrusive format for government regulation of insurance markets may be required if the private sector is to be successful in dealing with time-varying risks and capital costs.

Insurers might also be concerned about possible changes in the level of risk over time. For example, global warming could trigger more intense weather-related disasters, and/or local environmental degradation might change the risk landscape in the next several decades. One way to address this concern would be to have renegotiable contracts every X years based on new information validated by the scientific community in much the same way that there are renegotiable loans with adjustable rates.

Demand Side Some homeowners may worry about the financial solvency of their insurer over a long period, particularly if they have the feeling they would be locked-in if they sign an LTI contract. Consumers might also fear being overcharged if insurers set premiums that reflect the uncertainty associated with long-term risks. Furthermore, those who have not suffered a loss for 10 years but have a 25-year LTI may feel that the premiums are unfairly priced. It is thus

essential that the design of an LTI contract anticipates these concerns and be transparent to the policyholder.

Developing an LTI Policy

Jaffee, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2008) have developed a simple two-period model in a competitive market setting where premiums reflect risk to compare the expected benefits of annual contracts vs. LTI. We show that an LTI policy reduces the marketing costs for insurers over 1-period policies and also reduces the search costs to the consumer if their insurer decides to cancel its policy at the end of period 1. If one permits the policyholder to cancel an LTI policy at the end of period 1 if she learns that the cost of a 1-period policy is sufficiently low to justify paying a cancellation cost (C), then it is always optimal for the insurer to market an LTI policy and for a consumer to purchase one. The insurer will set C at a level which enables it break even on those policies that are canceled before the maturity date. We should note that if one is going to develop any type of LTI policy that would be marketed by the private sector then premiums need to reflect risk (Principle 1). By giving insurers the freedom to charge prices that enable them to break even, they will have incentives to develop new products. Under the current state regulatory arrangements where many insurance commissioners have limited insurers' ability to charge risk-based premiums in hazard-prone areas, no insurance company would even entertain the possibility of marketing an LTI policy. They would be concerned that the regulator would clamp down on them now or in the future regarding what price they could charge, so that a long-term contract would be infeasible from a financial point of view.

7. A Natural Candidate for Long-Term Insurance: Flood through the NFIP

Given the existing tension between state insurance regulators and the insurance industry, we feel that it is best politically to introduce LTI by focusing on flood insurance since this coverage is provided by the federal government.¹⁴ Created in 1968 as a result of the refusal by insurers to cover this risk because they viewed it as uninsurable, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) sold over 5.5 million policies in 2007 (compared to 2.5 million in 1992) and covered over \$1.1 trillion in asset (compared to only \$237 billion in 1992). These figures were stable in 2008. Given that the NFIP is up for renewal in Congress in April 2009 and there may be a window for change in the coming months.

More specifically, it would be useful to consider whether one could make flood insurance policies long-term by tying them to mortgages. By instituting such a program, insurance would be connected directly with the property rather to the homeowner. One might also consider having everyone in flood prone areas ***required*** to take out the insurance just as those who own a car are required to take out automobile insurance today whether or not they are financing the purchase of their car. If a homeowner moved to another location, the flood insurance policy would remain with the property.

¹⁴ For more details on the National Flood Insurance Program see the paper by Mark Brown prepared for this conference.

Why Have a Long-Term Flood Insurance Policy?

A long-term flood insurance program would offer homeowners currently residing in flood-prone areas a fixed rate for a fixed period of time (e.g. 5, 10 or 20 years). If the homeowner moved away from the area before the end of the policy period, then the insurance policy would automatically be transferred to the new property owner at the same rate. For those homeowners who were being charged subsidized rates because their homes were constructed prior to the time that their community joined the NFIP, these rates would be maintained for the length of the policy period. For homeowners who constructed homes after the date that their community joined the program, their rates would be actuarially based.

There are a number of reasons why such a long-term flood insurance policy would be a great improvement over the current annual policies from the perspective of the relevant stakeholders: homeowners, FEMA, banks and financial institutions and the general taxpayer. By fixing flood insurance rates at a fixed price, homeowners would be provided with financial stability. They would also have knowledge that they are protected against water damage from floods and hurricanes. This would reduce the legal problems that have plagued recent hurricanes (Florida hurricanes of 2004, Katrina, Ike). Homeowners would not have to argue that the losses were due to wind so they could collect on their homeowners policy. There would still be a question as to whether the government would be paying for some of the loss because it was caused by water or whether private insurers would be responsible because it was wind-related damage.

Long term flood insurance would also assure the spread of risk within the program since most homeowners in flood prone areas would be covered. If flood insurance were required for all homeowners residing in hazard-prone areas, then there would be even a larger spread of risk. This would provide much needed financial revenue for the program over time by having a much larger policy base than is currently available.

Long-term policies would prevent individuals from cancelling their policies after they have not experienced a flood for several years even if they are required to purchase the policy as a condition for a federally insured mortgage. The banks and financial institutions have often not enforced this regulation because few of them have been fined and/or the mortgages are transferred to banks in non-flood prone regions of the country that have not focused on either the flood hazard risk or the requirement that homeowners may have to purchase this coverage. Consider the flood in August 1998 that damaged property in northern Vermont. Of the 1549 victims of this disaster, FEMA found 84 percent of the homeowners in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) did not have insurance, even though 45 percent of these individuals were required to purchase this coverage. (Tobin and Calfee, 2005)

If long-term loans for mitigation were offered by banks, individuals with long-term flood insurance policies would be encouraged to invest in cost-effective risk reduction measures. To

highlight this point, consider the following simple example. Suppose a property owner could invest \$1,500 to flood proof his home so as to reduce the water damage by \$30,000 from a future flood or hurricane with an annual probability of 1 in 100. The NFIP should be willing to reduce the annual premium by \$300 (i.e., $1/100 \times \$30,000$) to reflect the lower expected losses that would occur if a flood or hurricane hit the area in which the policyholder was residing. If the house was expected to last for 10 or more years, the net present value of the expected benefit of investing in this measure would exceed the upfront cost at an annual discount rate as high as 15 percent.

Today many property owners would be reluctant to incur the \$1,500 expenditure, because they would get only \$300 back next year and are likely to only consider the benefits over the next few years when making their decisions. If they underweight the future, the expected discounted benefits would likely be less than the \$1,500 upfront costs. In addition, budget constraints could discourage them from investing in the mitigation measure. Other considerations would also play a role in a family's decision not to invest in these measures. The family may not be clear how long they will reside in the house and/or whether their insurer would reward them again when their policy is renewed. There may also be a failure to appreciate the interdependencies associated with floods, earthquakes and other disasters. More specifically, by investing in mitigation measures, one will not only reduce the potential losses to one's own property but alleviate damage to neighboring structures.

If a 20 year flood insurance policy were tied to the property, then the homeowner could take out a 20-year \$1,500 home improvement loan linked to the mortgage at an annual interest rate of 10 percent, resulting in payments of \$145 per year. If the insurance premium was reduced by \$300, the savings to the homeowner each year would be \$155. Alternatively, this loan could be incorporated as part of the mortgage at even a lower interest rate than 10 percent.

Long-term insurance and mitigation loans would constitute new financial products. A bank would have a financial incentive to provide this type of loan, since it is now better protected against a catastrophic loss to the property, and the NFIP knows that its potential loss from a major disaster is reduced. Moreover, the general public will now be less likely to have large amounts of their tax dollars going for disaster relief. Indeed, prior to the 2005 hurricane season, which inflicted nearly \$18 billion in flood claims, the NFIP had a cumulative deficit of about \$3 billion after 37 years of operation (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2008). A win-win-win-win situation for all!

8. Conclusion

The past 15 years have witnessed a series of large-scale catastrophes that have inflicted historical economic and insured losses. Half of the 20 most costly insured catastrophes between 1970 and 2007 occurred since 2001, and all were natural disasters except for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The U.S. has been particularly challenged because nine of these 20 disasters for

insurance occurred in this country. The growing concentration of population and structures in high-risk areas, combined with the potential consequences of global warming, are likely to lead to even more devastating catastrophes in the coming years unless cost-effective risk reduction measures are put in place.

We propose four principles to help define a more sustainable response to these challenges and show how Florida has violated most of them. It is important to make sure that the situation in this state is known and understood so it would not come as a surprise in the aftermath of the next major hurricane there that the state-run insurer Citizens might easily become insolvent.

The challenge facing the United States, and many other countries, is how to encourage residents and businesses to invest in loss-reduction measures and insurance in advance of a disaster so as to avoid the large-scale disaster relief that will be provided after a catastrophe occurs. A natural way to include mitigation as an important feature of the current insurance programs is through premium reductions and long-term loans. To date most of these private insurance programs have focused on the financial component following a disaster not the loss reduction element.

Programs which combine both elements, such as the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), require that mitigation measures are in place prior to the next disaster. Short-term considerations may lead political representatives **not** to enforce these regulations. Indeed, even when risk reduction measures are available and are cost-effective, many people are still not investing in them. It is thus important to better understand how people, who are potentially exposed to disasters, make their decision on whether to purchase insurance and invest in adequate risk reduction measures.

The past few years have provided additional empirical evidence supporting the natural disaster syndrome. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina many victims suffered severe losses from flooding because they had not mitigated their homes and did not have flood insurance to cover the resulting damage. As a result an unprecedented level of federal disaster assistance was provided these victims and the affected communities. There are many reasons why those in harm's way have not undertaken protective measures in advance of disaster. Many individuals believe that the event will not happen to them. In the case of New Orleans, some residents may have felt that they were fully protected by flood control measures such as the levees.¹⁵ This has led to increased development in hazard-prone areas without appropriate land-use regulations and well-enforced building codes. In addition, budget constraints and short time horizons may limit people's interest and ability to invest in hazard mitigation measures and to purchase insurance. Such a dynamic has been observed in many countries around the world.

We propose a new initiative that could address these issues: long-term insurance contracts coupled with long-term loans for encouraging the adoption of cost-effective mitigation measures and providing stability to homeowners. Given the benefits and potential difficulties in

¹⁵ FEMA clearly thought that the levees would provide this protection. Otherwise they would have designated the Lower Ninth Ward as a hazard-prone area and residents would have been eligible for flood insurance.

implementing such a program and we conclude that flood insurance would be a natural candidate for such a long-term program. Given that the NFIP is up for renewal in April 2009, there may be a political will to develop more effective solutions.

As the 2007 Economic Report of the President stated, “Insurance plays a vital role in America’s economy by helping households and businesses manage risks. (...) When insurance prices reflect underlying economic costs they can encourage a more efficient allocation of resources. Efforts to keep premiums for insurance against catastrophe hazards artificially low, whether through regulation or through subsidized government programs, can encourage excessively risky behavior on the part of those who might be affected by future catastrophes.” It is fair to say that two years after its publication, this federal will has not been translated into state and local actions.

Large-scale catastrophes are much more likely to occur now than 15 years ago for the reasons discussed in this paper. There is an opportunity for the Obama Administration and the U.S. Congress to take steps now to reduce these losses and protect the Nation against extreme events in a more systematic way than we have to date. We need a more coherent national strategy for managing these risks in a new era of catastrophes.

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